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In November at Prague, NATO will announce the next round of its enlargement. A 
critical question that arouses much controversy is whether or not to admit one or more 
Baltic state. First, many allege that the Baltic states are only defensible by nuclear 
weapons.2 They argue that NATO must not reach that stage with Russia. Rather than 
antagonize Russia by making those states members, it is proposed, NATO should leave 
them aside and let the European Union accept them instead.
This approach itself raises troubling questions. If Moscow can successfully and 
unilaterally determine other states' security policies, with NATO acquiescence, then the 
alliance will have been seriously, perhaps fatally, compromised. Second, if Moscow is so 
belligerent from a stance of inferiority, then it certainly should be deterred now by 
superior force and resolution. Third, the notions of empire and spheres of influence are 
no longer acceptable in Europe. If the West can act legitimately in the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), which constitutes Europe's "near abroad," why should it 
abandon the Baltic states?3
Fourth, given Moscow's military inferiority, NATO's military assets, and Chechnya's 
demonstration of what an aroused citizenry can do, NATO should not fear Russia's 
current armed forces. If Moscow wants another arms race with Europe and America, it 
only will dig its grave faster, as its leadership fully understands. Fifth, the alliance must 
not shrink from stating NATO enlargement's overriding strategic rationale. It transcends 
merely extending the European security community, although the OSCE now confirms 
the Baltic states' commitment to democracy and successful resolution of minority 
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issues.4 Rather, the real reason is that NATO and European Union (EU) enlargement 
increasingly forecloses the Russian elite's option of restoring and extending autocracy 
and empire, each being the natural accompaniment of the other. The Baltic states' 
supposed indefensibility (an argument that would have deterred the West from forming 
NATO and growing thereafter), their supposed problems with minorities that Moscow 
and its apologists grossly inflate, and the notion that their membership in NATO 
somehow threatens Russia's security are equally unfounded and illogical.
Behind all these arguments lies the belief that Russia deserves a privileged security 
status vis-à-vis its neighbors and interlocutors. Unfortunately nothing yet indicates 
Moscow's readiness to acknowledge its Baltic neighbors' "equal security," which it 
habitually demands for itself. Recently President Putin actually compared the Baltic 
states to Macedonia and demanded that Europe supervise their minority policies, an 
explicit derogation of their sovereignty.5 In 2000-2001 Moscow surreptitiously moved 
tactical nuclear weapons into Kaliningrad oblast'and tried to entice Germany into side 
deals on the Baltic states and Kaliningrad.6 Putin, after urging partnership with NATO 
and saying that he did not oppose their membership in NATO, publicly urged Russian 
residents to agitate against Baltic governments.7 Russia's government and politicians 
regularly threaten the Baltic states with economic war if they join NATO and Russian 
diplomats habitually tell Baltic officials that Russia is going to return.8 Since economic 
war has long been Moscow's official policy, it is unlikely that the Baltic states' exclusion 
from NATO would soften the Kremlin's resolve.9
Nor does Moscow want them to enter the EU, although it claims otherwise. Indeed, 
during Yevgeny Primakov's tenure in office, Moscow demanded that, since Baltic 
membership would injure its economic interests, Russia must obtain from Brussels 
compensation for anticipated lost benefits before Moscow would accept their 
membership. Russia effectively presented the EU with an ultimatum demanding 
compensation while simultaneously alleging violations of minority rights as grounds for 
blocking Baltic accession into the EU.10
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Many Russian writers regard the Baltic region as an area they could blow over if they 
but carelessly nodded in that direction. Or they portray those states as parasitic 
economies which survive by exploiting Russia.11 Neo-geopoliticians like Aleksandr' 
Pikaev apparently also remain unable to see the area in any way but an imperial and 
atavistic perspective of Realpolitik. Pikaev drew five lessons concerning Russo-Baltic 
relations and regional security.
First, when the Baltic states are under Western influence, their territory invariably 
becomes a pathway to attack Russia. Peace with Russia only comes when they "enjoy 
de facto or de jure independence from the outside world." Second, if Russia is isolated 
from the Baltic Sea's warm-water ports, it will not cease striving to shatter that 
geopolitical barrier. (Here Pikaev overtly threatens revisionism and war even though 
nobody is isolating Russia from these ports.) The third lesson is that Baltic security is 
unthinkable without Russia. While, surely, Russia must participate in any regional 
system, such thinking chauvinistically demands precedence and unequal security and 
betrays a desire to postpone any discussion of European security until Russia can 
dictate its terms.12 Russia's refusal to denounce the 1940 annexations as such 
intentionally raises questions about the current Baltic states' legality and shows the 
attempt to intimidate these governments.13
If Pikaev's fourth lesson is that Russian democracy is a guarantee of Baltic security, 
then Yel'tsin's and Putin's failures to democratize, Putin's regime of police capitalism, 
and Primakov's and then Putin's accession through "constitutional coups" enhance 
regional instability, insecurity and the need for NATO's presence. Finally, Pikaev's fifth 
lesson is that interrupting Baltic states' economic cooperation with Russia injures them 
more than Russia. This justifies Russia's ham-handed economic warfare against the 
Baltic states. Moreover, Putin and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov share this apparently 
official view.14
Evidently the Baltic states should forego a chance for prosperity to benefit Russia! More 
generally, across Eastern Europe, Moscow seeks control over energy supplies, ports 
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and strategic economic sectors, subsidizes political parties and compliant politicians, 
and uses energy companies, the foreign intelligence service (SVR), and organized 
crime, often jointly, to establish strategic positions in these states, conduct 
"disinformation" against pro-Western politicians and governments, and undermine pro-
Western policies.15
Key issues for NATO
Today it appears that the Baltic states will join NATO. Russia's demand for NATO's 
demilitarization as its condition for accepting enlargement is dangerous and displays 
Moscow's continuing inability to accept European realities.16 NATO and EU 
enlargement is part of the broader evolution of a normative European security 
community with a common commitment to democracy and liberalism.17 By resisting this 
process Moscow isolates itself from Europe rather than Europe isolating Russia.
But other key issues exist for NATO and the Baltic states. First is the Baltic states' 
readiness to shoulder membership's military burdens. Across Eastern Europe, leftist, 
Euroskeptic, and pro-Moscow factions oppose increased defense spending and 
submission to the EU's Acquis Communautaire.18 There is a real danger of their victory, 
although most citizens in aspirant countries currently support European integration. But 
the Baltic states must fulfill NATO's military desiderata and their own Membership Action 
Plans (MAPs) under NATO's "supervision" to enter the alliance.19
The second key issue is NATO's relationship to the EU's Common European Security 
and Defense Program (CESDP). While this may seem a "theological" question, it 
actually is of utmost importance, for if this inter-organizational relationship were to fail or 
even malfunction, there would be enormous and enduring repercussions. This issue is 
particularly important to states that are members of NATO but not the EU, to the Baltic 
states that seek membership in either or both organizations, and to states that are 
members of the EU, but not NATO (e.g., Finland and Sweden).
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Ideally, European integration and trans-Atlanticism should be harmonious processes. 
But Europe's smaller countries, including the Baltic states, insist that the trans-Atlantic 
principle be preeminent. They all advocate America's leading role in Europe, rightly 
fearing that otherwise their interests will be sacrificed on the altar of the larger states' 
competing national interests or that any one of those states might make a deal with 
Russia at their expense.20 Not surprisingly, many small European countries, not just the 
Baltic states, still have well-founded reservations about Russian policy.21
Baltic participants strongly advocate their membership, underscoring their commitment 
to a democratic order, liberalism and cooperative security. They also insist that they will 
fulfill NATO's and the EU's requirements. They frequently reiterate their ability and 
desire to contribute to European security and not be mere security consumers. They 
see NATO enlargement not in terms of preserving or extending new European dividing 
lines but rather as a way to end their ambiguous status and Russia's talk of red lines. 
NATO and the EU, for their part, must show that Russia no longer can define for itself a 
privileged status and sphere of influence in the Baltic region or in Europe. Indeed, if 
Russia truly considers using tactical nuclear weapons in Europe against the Baltic 
states and NATO, that is all the more reason to act and not hold back. Simultaneously 
Baltic leaders argue that only NATO, and not the EU's notional "rapid reaction forces," 
can defend them against real threats.
While French analysts view the CESDP as a potentially independent and purely 
European replacement for NATO, it still exists only on paper, claims to the contrary 
notwithstanding.22 Nor did the Baltic states accept earlier French pressure to choose 
between the EU and NATO.23 No one can be certain that, if future threats to regional 
and/or European security occur after 2003 when the CESDP is supposed to materialize, 
then an effective strategic military-political consensus among major European 
contributors to (and directors of) that force will develop sufficiently quickly. Thus 
important questions surround the CESDP and its ability to provide security.
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It remains uncertain whether European governments will financially support the 
CESDP's headline goals of 60,000 men to conduct planned missions by 2003. No force 
besides NATO currently can enforce or make peace in Macedonia or elsewhere. As 
Richard Perle wrote, "[I]f a modest reduction in the level of American forces deployed in 
Bosnia sounds the alarm in Europe, what should we make of the Blair-Chirac fantasy 
that the EU will soon be poised to go it alone when there's trouble in Europe?"24
Moreover, Russia's relationship with the CESDP remains unclear. Moscow provisionally 
welcomed the CESDP because it supposedly weakens and divides NATO even as it 
solicits Russian participation. But Russia is very uncertain about the CESDP's future 
direction and therefore wishes to be regularly informed and consulted concerning the 
program's developments.25 While Moscow certainly wishes to reduce NATO's viability 
in Europe, will it then accept a force that is supposed to act from the Baltic to the 
Transcaucasus? It is quite possible that the CESDP will be too weak to succeed, but 
rather will drain resources from NATO, become a mechanism that corrodes the alliance 
from within, and fail to bring security or reliable defense to states that most need it.
Until these issues are confronted and resolved, East European skepticism about the 
program and preference for NATO and the American connection will exist. But despite 
the caviling about US unilateralism, in fact the allies have told America that they would 
follow America's lead if the US were to define the NATO consensus concerning criteria 
and who should be invited at Prague.26 Obviously this is a far cry from the terrible press 
that "United States unilateralism" received earlier in Europe. President Jacques Chirac 
of France said on his Baltic trip in July 2001 that the determination about Baltic 
membership in NATO was essentially Washington's decision and strongly hinted at 
support for their membership in NATO and the EU.27 Apparently this consensus 
emerged at NATO's Brussels summit in June 2001 and owes much to President Bush's 
Warsaw University speech that articulated an expansive and inclusive vision of the 
future map of European security.28 Conceivably, American protagonists of "coalition-
building," in their eagerness to please Putin, could hamper this trend.
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Conclusion
Presently most signs point to Baltic membership in NATO after Prague and in the EU 
soon afterward. Then the Baltic states will be formally part of an indivisible security 
system that enjoys a pan-European credibility and legitimacy. They will no longer be 
isolated, confined to a regional ghetto, or wholly subjected to the great powers' caprices. 
They will be part of the European ensemble, signifying the true meaning of European 
integration. And if Russia truly desires to play in that ensemble, rather than opposing the 
Baltic states, it should learn from them.
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